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Strict Property Tax Caps: 
 A Case Study of Massachusetts’s Proposition 2 ½, its 
Shortcomings, and the Path Forward 
 




Strict property tax caps are statutory measures that limit municipalities 
from raising property taxes by more than a certain percentage each fiscal 
year.  In addition, they place a ceiling on the total amount of real and personal 
property tax revenue a municipality can raise annually.  Often spearheaded 
by voter initiative, strict property tax caps are championed by proponents as 
a way to limit taxes and increase civic participation.  Conversely, detractors 
frame caps as artificial barriers that improperly constrain local governments 
in their taxing powers.  
Massachusetts voters approved a strict property tax cap, Proposition 2 ½, 
in 1980.  Proposition 2 ½ provides that communities may increase taxes on 
real and personal property annually by no more than 2.5% of the total fair 
cash value of such property.  Further, it states that the total annual property 
tax revenue raised by municipalities cannot surpass 2.5% of the assessed value 
of all taxable property in each community. 
In the three-and-a-half decades since Proposition 2 ½ was adopted, many 
cities and towns have found that they cannot raise sufficient revenue to meet 
their communities’ needs because of the restrictions imposed by the cap.  
However, the statute does contain a side-step maneuver: a community can 
override its levy limit with a majority vote.   
This Note examines the total number of override votes—attempted and 
successful—from 1980 through 2010.  In doing so, it assesses the impact 
Proposition 2 ½ has had and is continuing to have on municipalities, namely 
the services local governments provide to their residents.  The data indicates 
that the number of proposed override votes has increased over time, as 
communities have found that they are unable to meet their needs under the 
2.5% increase limit.  Further, the vote totals make clear that successful 
override votes happen more frequently in wealthier communities versus poorer 
communities.  
Based on this data, this Note argues that Proposition 2 ½’s 2.5% levy cap 
is an unrealistic and artificial barrier.  Strict property tax caps place arbitrary 
limits on the amounts municipalities can raise taxes, without regard to changes 
in inflation, the cost of providing services, or community needs.  The Note 
concludes by suggesting potential alternatives moving forward.  
                                                 
*  University of New Hampshire School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2018; Saint 
Michael’s College, B.A. 2015. 
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A distaste for taxes has marked the American spirit from the time of the 
country’s founding.1  From rallying cries of “no taxation without 
representation,” to “read my lips: no new taxes,” a revulsion to state-imposed 
levies—even those used to provide heavily utilized social services—permeates 
American history.2  Beginning in the early 1980s, the conservative resurgence, 
                                                 
1  See JUSTIN DU RIVAGE, REVOLUTION AGAINST EMPIRE: TAXES, POLITICS, AND 
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2017) (discussing factors fueling the 
American Revolution). 
2  George H.W. Bush, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the 
Republican National Convention in New Orleans - August 18, 1988, THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 24, 2017, 3:17 PM), 
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emboldened by the rise of Ronald Reagan, pushed to cut taxes at all levels of 
government.3  Against this backdrop, a number of states instituted strict 
property tax caps, often by ballot initiative.4  One such state was 
Massachusetts, which adopted Proposition 2 ½ in 1980.5  
A brief overview of the framework of strict property tax caps is covered 
in Part I.  In short, strict property tax caps limit the percentage communities 
can increase property taxes in any one year.6  Proposition 2 ½, for example, 
places a ceiling on the total annual property tax revenue that a municipality 
can raise: 2.5% of the total assessed value of the taxable property in the 
community.7  It also prohibits communities from levying an increase in taxes 
of more than 2.5% per year of the total full and fair cash value of all taxable 
real and personal property.8   
Part II details the history of strict property tax caps.9  In Massachusetts, 
the strict property tax cap scheme saw defeat on Beacon Hill before being 
overwhelmingly approved by voters in November of 1980.10  This Note not 
only considers the history of Massachusetts’s Proposition 2 ½, but also 
discusses how the vast majority of states that have strict property tax caps have 
had them implemented through plebiscite rather than by legislatures.11   
Part III examines Proposition 2 ½ override voting data from each of 
Massachusetts’s 351 cities and towns, from 1983 (when the first override vote 
took place) through 2010.12  The data shows a dramatic increase in the number 
of proposed override votes over time, as municipalities have become 
                                                 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25955 [https://perma.cc/3YL2-RY4F]; see 
generally HENRY M. GLADNEY, NO TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: 1768 
PETITION, MEMORIAL, AND REMONSTRANCE (2014). 
3  John Samples, Limiting Government, 1980 – 2010, CATO INSTITUTE, Mar./Apr. 
2010, https://www.cato.org/policy-report/marchapril-2010/limiting-government-
1980-2010 [https://perma.cc/VZD6-HUWC].  
4  Hector Chang & Christine Wen, Tax Caps in Other States: Lessons for New 
York, CORNELL U. DEP’T OF CITY & REGIONAL PLAN. CREATIVE RESPONSES TO 
FISCAL STRESS PROJECT (Dec. 2014). 
5  Barbara Anderson, From Barbara Anderson, A Little History, BOS. GLOBE 
(May 5, 2008), 
http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/regional_editions/overridecentral/2008/05/bar
bara_anderso.html [https://perma.cc/HG7P-5P2X]. 
6  MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., LEVY LIMITS: A PRIMER ON 
PROPOSITION 2 ½ (June 2007). 
7  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016). 
8  Id. 
9  See generally Citizens for Limited Taxation & Citizens Economic Research 
Foundation, Celebrating Proposition 2 ½ after 30 Years, CITIZENS FOR LIMITED 
TAXATION (Nov. 4, 2010), http://cltg.org/cltg/Prop_2/index.htm. 
10  Id.   
11  See generally Chang & Wen, supra, note 4. 
12  MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL DATABANK/LOCAL 
AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011). 
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increasingly unable to meet their obligations under the 2.5% cap.13  From 
Fiscal Year 1983 through 1989, the average number of override votes in the 
entire Commonwealth was 69 votes per year.14  Between Fiscal Year 2000 
through 2009, however, that number had risen to 118 votes per year.15  
Additionally, the data indicates that wealthier communities are far more likely 
to approve override votes versus poorer communities.16  In communities where 
the median household income is less than $49,999, the success rate of an 
override vote is 27.125%.17  At the opposite end of the spectrum, in 
communities where the median household income exceeds $125,000, an 
override vote has a 69.435% chance of passing.18  Through examining the 
voting data of municipalities in Massachusetts, it becomes clear that the 
current system leads to dramatic discrepancies in municipal services between 
communities based on wealth. 
Consequently, this Note argues that although these measures have proven 
popular with voters, they present obstacles to efficient municipal governing 
and impose arbitrary limits on municipal taxing abilities.19  Proposition 2 ½’s 
formula is in need of reform, as municipalities cannot operate under current 
constraints, and the framework of the law favors wealthy communities over 
poorer communities, leading to a bifurcation of services between towns.  
Moreover, while the intent of Proposition 2 ½ was to afford communities 
greater local control and to curb rising property taxes, the measure has created 
a more muddled situation.20  Even with an override measure in place, many 
communities have been unable to meet their obligations.21  This issue has been 
exacerbated given that the needs of many communities have significantly 
changed since 1980—the rate of inflation has consistently outpaced levy 
limits, and local aid has failed to materialize, all while Proposition 2 ½ has not 
changed.22   
                                                 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  BOSTON REGIONAL METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORG., MASS. MEDIAN 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY TOWN, 1979-2010 (2011); MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF 
LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL DATABANK/LOCAL AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET 
FY1983-2010 (2011). 
17  Id. 
18  Id. 
19  Charles Kenney, Massachusetts Makes a Comeback, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., 
May 18, 1986, at 1–7. 
20  Allan R. Gold, In Massachusetts, Budgets That Hurt, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 
1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/15/us/in-massachusetts-budgets-that-
hurt.html [https://perma.cc/WQU7-AGPF]. 
21  MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL DATABANK/LOCAL 
AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011). 
22  Historical Inflation Rates: 1914-2017, U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, Jan. 24, 
2017, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/ 
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To remedy these difficulties, Part IV suggests several policy 
recommendations which could serve as alternatives to strict property tax caps.  
Potential reforms could include indexing the cap to the rate of inflation rather 
than holding it to a strict figure; or replacing the system with a cap on the total 
amount municipal budgets can increase each year, rather than a cap on the 
amount taxes can be increased.23  This Note concludes by arguing that 
Massachusetts, and other states that employ strict property tax caps, should 
consider alternatives that embrace the rationale behind strict property tax 
caps—stronger local control and a desire for greater government efficiency—





Strict property tax caps are statutory measures aimed at controlling the 
future growth of property taxes by limiting the ability of local governments to 
increase taxes above a certain percentage.24  While different states have 
implemented various formulas and percentages for calculating tax caps, the 
central purpose is the same: to limit local property taxes.25   
Under Massachusetts’s Proposition 2 ½, a ceiling is placed on 
municipalities’ ability to raise taxes.26  The increase limit, or levy limit, is the 
maximum amount a municipality can increase taxes on a yearly basis.27  
Proposition 2 ½ mandates that municipalities cannot increase property taxes 
by more than 2.5% annually.28  Further, communities cannot impose a property 
tax rate greater than 2.5% of the assessed “full and fair cash value” of all 
taxable real and personal property in the community.29  
The limitations imposed on tax increases have exceptions, however.  For 
example, if new property is added to the tax roles, it is not included in 
calculating the ceiling.30  This exception for “new growth” allows for the tax 
                                                 
[https://perma.cc/2Q2M-8EDN]; Luc Schuster, The Rise and Fall of Local Aid in 
Massachusetts, MASSACHUSETTS BUDGET AND POLICY CENTER (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.massbudget.org/report_window.php?loc=local_aid_long_term.html 
[https://perma.cc/G244-27EM].  
23  C. CHRISTINE FILMORE, N.H. TOWN & CITY, WHAT IS NEW IN MUNICIPAL 
BUDGETING? (Sept./Oct. 2013). 
24  Hector Chang & Christine Wen, Tax Caps in Other States: Lessons for New 
York, CORNELL U. DEP’T OF CITY & REGIONAL PLAN. CREATIVE RESPONSES TO 
FISCAL STRESS PROJECT (Dec. 2014). 
25  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016); Chang & Wen, supra note 4. 
26  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016). 
27  Id. 
28  Id.  The level limit will at most be equal to the levy ceiling (2.5% maximum 
increase year to year); the levy limit cannot exceed the levy ceiling. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
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levy to be increased by the amount of taxes collected from the new property, 
without affecting the ceiling.31  Additionally, the 2.5% cap and increase limits 
can be exempted for specific purposes.  “Capital exclusions,” if approved by a 
majority of voters, allow for the omission of capital expenditures from 
Proposition 2 ½’s limitations.32  Similarly, “debt exclusions,” with majority 
approval, are excluded if the new debt is being incurred for a specific 
purpose.33  Finally, tax increases for water/sewer system construction are 
excluded from Proposition 2 ½’s limitations.34   
Proposition 2 ½ also allows for override votes.  By majority vote, a 
community can permanently increase its levy limit.35  A specific dollar amount 
must be put to ballot, together with a stated purpose for what the funds 
generated from the tax increase will go towards.36  Proposition 2 ½ overrides 
must be used to fund municipal operating budgets, not to fund capital 
projects.37  Some communities that have attempted override votes have chosen 
to request large sums for “general operating expenses,” while others have 
multiple votes in a single year, each corresponding to a specific line item in 
the budget.38  When Proposition 2 ½ was passed in 1980, a two-thirds majority 
vote was required in order to approve an override; this requirement was 
amended by the General Court in 1981 so that only a majority vote is needed 
to successfully increase a community’s levy limit above the cap.39   
Similarly, Proposition 2 ½ also allows for underride votes.  A community 
can reduce its levy limit by a majority vote, or by petitioning the state 
                                                 
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
33  Id.  (such as municipal bonds issued for capital expenditures that extend beyond 
the current year.  Note that both capital and debt exclusions originally required a two-
thirds vote by voters in order to be exempt from the limitation on tax levy increases, 
but the requirement was reduced to a majority vote by a 1981 amendment passed by 
the Massachusetts General Court). 
34  Id.  (provision must be accepted by the “local appropriating authority,” and 
approved by a majority vote of the community). 
35  Id. 
36  MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., PROPOSITION 2 1/2 BALLOT 
QUESTIONS (Oct. 19, 2013). 
37  Robert David Sullivan, Two and a Half Decades of Prop. 2 ½, 
COMMONWEALTH MAG., Winter 2005, at 26; capital projects are excluded from 
Proposition 2 ½’s limits, as discussed above. 
38  MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL DATABANK/LOCAL 
AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011) (some communities 
have had dozens of votes in a single year for smaller amounts of money, for everything 
from town Christmas lights, to replacing dasher boards on the town skating rink; the 
norm, however, is to request funds for the general operating budget).   
39  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, STATE-LOCAL 
RELATIONS: A PARTNERSHIP APPROACH 64 (1995). 
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legislature for a reduction.40  Even if an underride vote is successful, only the 
ceiling is reduced; the increase limit, which prevents municipalities from 
increasing property taxes annually beyond 2.5%, is still in place.41  If an 
underride vote is successful, the levy limit can later be increased by a 
successful override vote.   
In Massachusetts, taxes levied on real and personal property constitute 
“the main tax imposed by cities and towns, and is usually their largest source 
of revenue.”42  The amount of money a community raises in property taxes 
must be sufficient to fund: all town “appropriations, [services,] a reserve for 
abatements and exemptions, and other amounts required by law to be raised” 
minus “estimated receipts from state and local sources and appropriations from 
available funds and reserves.”43  The majority of municipal operating budgets 
are funded through property taxes.44  Consequently, a cap on municipalities’ 
ability to raise property taxes above a certain level can have a dramatic impact 
on a community’s ability to provide services, as well as its overall fiscal well-
being.   
 
III. HISTORY OF STRICT PROPERTY TAX CAPS 
 
A. The Beginnings: California’s Proposition 13 
 
California introduced the first state-wide limitation on local governments’ 
abilities to levy property taxes with the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978.45  
Passed by voter initiative, Proposition 13 amended the California Constitution 
to fix property taxes at no more than 1% of real value, in addition to restricting 
annual increases to the rate of inflation, not to exceed 2%.46  Override votes 
are allowed if the revenue from the proposed tax increases are approved by 
two-thirds of voters.47   
In Nordlinger v. Hahn, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the legality of 
California’s strict property tax cap regime.48  The Court specifically looked at 
Proposition 13’s framework for reassessment of taxes upon the sale of 
property, which can result in one landowner paying higher taxes than his 
neighbors.49  The Court found that California’s exemption scheme was 
                                                 
40  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016). 
41  Id. 
42  KATHLEEN COLLEARY, MASSACHUSETTS MUNICIPAL LAW § 6.2.1 (2015). 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  Chang & Wen, supra note 4. 
46  CAL. CONST. art. XIII, A, § 1; Chang & Wen, supra note 4. 
47  CAL. CONST. art. XIII, A, § 1 (with the reassessed value becoming the new 
basis).   
48  Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1992). 
49  Id. 
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Constitutional, as it furthered a legitimate purpose, and did not discriminate 
with respect to the tax rate, nor with respect to the annual rate of assessment 
adjustments.50   
The impact of Proposition 13 on California is unclear, as multiple 
exceptions have been added to the policy over the subsequent four decades.51  
For example, whenever property is sold in California, it is reassessed, thereby 
changing the taxes (although not the tax rate) on the property.52  Cities and 
towns are also permitted to create “local improvement districts.”53  Once such 
districts are approved by voters, the property within the district is exempt from 
the Proposition 13 tax cap.54  In exchange for this exemption, property owners 
within the “improvement districts” must then directly pay for infrastructure 
improvements, such as sidewalk construction and storm-water systems.55   
Although Proposition 13 provided a framework for other states looking to 
adopt strict property tax caps, it can hardly be said that California currently 
has any sort of strict property tax-cap scheme.  Rather, it has a system so 
riddled with exceptions that there is no coherent structure left, resulting in a 
number of undesirable consequences.  Land-use decisions have been made 
based on the ability of land to generate revenue, rather than on need.56  
Complex methods to circumvent the system, whether through the creation of 
local improvement districts or otherwise, have multiplied.57  Significantly, the 
cap led to a dramatic decrease in local revenue.58  In Fiscal Year 1980, the first 
year after the cap went into effect, county property tax revenue dropped from 
$10.3 billion to $5.04 billion.59  The ensuing crisis led to a one-time $4.85 
billion bailout by the state for municipalities, together with an increase of state 
control over local finances.60   
  
B.  Massachusetts 
 
Following California’s adoption, the strict property tax cap movement 
quickly spread east, with Massachusetts approving Proposition 2 ½ in 1980.61  
Unlike California’s Proposition 13 which amended the state constitution, 
                                                 
50  Id. 
51  Chang & Wen, supra note 4. 
52  CAL. CONST. art. XIII, A, § 1. 
53  San Francisco Office of Economic and Workforce Development, Community 
Benefit Districts, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO (2017), 
http://oewd.org/community-benefit-districts [https://perma.cc/Q4JE-8E3T]. 
54  CAL. CONST. art. XIII, A, § 1. 
55  San Francisco Office of Economic and Workforce Development, supra note 53. 
56  Chang & Wen, supra note 4. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016). 
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Proposition 2 ½ is a law, subject to legislative repeal or amendment.62  
Proposition 2 ½ was first presented as legislation in the Massachusetts House 
of Representatives in 1980; it failed, 155 to 5 votes.63  At the time, the 
overwhelming majority of state legislators saw it as a “destructive, small-
minded, reactionary assault on public services,” with both Governor Edward 
King and former Governor Michael Dukakis opposing it, too.64   
Subsequently, Proposition 2 ½ was passed by ballot initiative.65  In 
Massachusetts, the ballot initiative process was made a part of the 
Massachusetts Constitution in 1918.66  Ballot initiatives allow individuals and 
interest groups to advance their policy objectives; accordingly, almost all 
states that have strict property tax caps have had them implemented through 
citizen initiative.67  Using this tool, the advocacy group Citizens for Limited 
Taxation spearheaded a state-wide signature collection drive for Proposition 2 
½ following its defeat in the Statehouse.68  The group secured enough support 
to place the petition on the November 1980 ballot.69   
The measure passed overwhelmingly, with 59% of Massachusetts voters 
supporting it.70  Consequently, Proposition 2 ½ became law, limiting 
communities to imposing property taxes no greater than 2.5% of the “full and 
fair cash value of real property,” and capping the annual increase in the tax 
levy to 2.5%.71   
                                                 
62  Id. 
63  See Citizens for Limited Taxation & Citizens Economic Research Foundation, 
supra note 9. 
64  Kenney, supra note 19. 
65  Citizens for Limited Taxation & Citizens Economic Research Foundation, 
supra note 9. 
66  Dina E. Conlin, The Ballot Initiative in Massachusetts: The Fallacy of Direct 
Democracy, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2004). 
67  Id. at 1087–88; see generally Chang & Wen, supra note 4 (five out of the seven 
states which have strict property tax caps have had them implemented through ballot 
initiative: California (1978), Massachusetts (1980), Oregon (1990), Illinois (1991), 
and Colorado (1992).  Unsurprisingly, strict property tax caps have been far more 
successful and expansive in states which allow voters to propose ballot questions as 
opposed to those which only allow the state legislature to propose ballot questions.  
Only New Jersey (2007) and New York (2012) have implemented strict property tax 
caps through their state legislatures).   
68  Citizens for Limited Taxation & Citizens Economic Research Foundation, 
supra note 9. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
71  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016) (in addition to the strict property tax 
cap, Proposition 2 ½ implemented other reforms, including limiting the automobile 
excise tax and eliminating school committee autonomy; these aspects of the statute are 
outside the scope of this Note). 
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In addition to introducing a strict property tax cap, the Proposition 2 ½ 
ballot measure included a number of other reforms.72  The law also reduced 
the excise tax on personal property such as automobiles, boats, farm animals, 
and machinery to 2.5%,73 down from 6.6%.74  Aside from the impact 
Proposition 2 ½ had on municipal budgets because of reduced property tax 
revenue, the reduction in revenue due to the reduced excise tax dramatically 
affected municipalities in their own right.75  While the mechanics and impact 
of these provisions of Proposition 2 ½ are outside of the scope of this Note, it 
is important to note that if a community approves a general override vote, then 
the local government can automatically increase the excise tax to 6.6% without 




In addition to California and Massachusetts, five other states have some 
form of strict property cap systems.77  The popularization of such caps can be 
attributed to several factors.  Anti-property tax sentiments developed across 
the country in the late 1970s and 1980s through the growth of interest groups 
promoting “taxpayer revolution[s]”, inspired by the “Reagan Revolution.”78  
The so-called “Taxpayer Bill of Rights” was proposed and debated in 
statehouses across the country, with several enacted.79  Strict property tax caps 
fit into the broader societal push of the time, with proponents advocating these 
measures not only as a way to limit the growth of taxes, but also to shrink the 
size of state and local governments.80   
                                                 
72  Id.; Citizens for Limited Taxation & Citizens Economic Research Foundation, 
supra note 9.  Significantly, the statute: forbid the Commonwealth from passing 
unfunded mandates on cities and towns; repealed school board fiscal autonomy; 
repealed compulsory binding arbitration for police and fire unions; and reconfigured 
the Department of Revenue to include the Division on Local Services. 
73  COLLEARY, supra note 42. 
74  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016). 
75  ZIMMERMAN, supra note 39. 
76  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016). 
77  See Chang & Wen, supra note 4 (New York implemented a strict property tax 
cap most recently, in 2012).   
78  Steven V. Melnik & David S. Cenedella, Tax Assessment in New York State, 4 
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 427 (2011); Ronald W. Reagan, Transcript of Reagan's Farewell 
Address to the American People, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 1989), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/12/news/transcript-of-reagan-s-farewell-address-
to-american-people.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/B86C-9HU4]. 
79  See generally Andrew Reschovsky, Taxpayer Bill of Rights: A Solution to 
Wisconsin’s Fiscal Problems or a Prescription for Future Fiscal Crises?, 88 MARQ. 
L. REV. 135 (2004). 
80  See generally id. 
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Barbara Anderson, who later became the executive director of Citizens for 
Limited Taxation, spearheaded the passage of Proposition 2 ½.81  She 
attributed the success of Proposition 2 ½ as the culmination of a number of 
factors: the combination of the conservative trends propelling Reagan to 
office, and the desire by many voters for greater local control, helped to drive 
the passage of Proposition 2 ½.82  Anderson also pointed to voter anger as a 
driving factor behind the ballot question’s success.83  Voters were frustrated 
with a legislature that was perceived as unresponsive to their needs and that 
continued to tax heavily through economically depressed years.84  The popular 
“override” of the legislature’s initial rejection of Proposition 2 ½ was a natural 
outgrowth of this frustration.  With no limit imposed on how high property 
taxes could rise, Massachusetts had the highest property taxes in the country 
in the years leading up to 1980.85  Consequently, the combination of voter 
frustration, voter empowerment, and a desire for lower taxes led to 
overwhelming support for the measure.   
 
1. Legal Challenges in the Commonwealth 
 
Despite the strong support Proposition 2 ½ saw at the ballot box, a little 
over a week after it was approved by voters, three legal challenges were filed 
– one by an individual taxpayer, another by a collation of objectors, and the 
third by the Massachusetts Teachers Association, a politically-influential 
union.86  The cases were consolidated and heard by the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts in early 1981.87  The plaintiffs advanced two arguments.  
First, they argued that Proposition 2 ½ “was not a proper subject of an initiative 
petition” and that the procedural requirements of the Massachusetts 
Constitution were not adequately followed.88  Second, the plaintiffs challenged 
whether a provision of the law relating to a deduction from taxable income on 
rent paid violated equal protection under the state Constitution.89   
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that in both 
substance and form, the petition was appropriate.90  The Court found that the 
initiative petition was properly originated by ten qualified voters, and then sent 
to the Attorney General.91  Further, the Court concluded that the Attorney 
                                                 
81  Anderson, supra note 5. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. 
84  Kenney, supra note 19. 
85  Anderson, supra note 5. 
86  Mass. Tchrs. Ass’n v. Sec’y of Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 213–14 (1981). 
87  Id. at 212. 
88  Id. 
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General’s summary of the law for the ballot was a fair summation of the act, 
and that an amendment to the measure was procedurally sound.92  With regards 
to the question over the renter’s deduction provision, the Court held that it did 
not violate Constitutional requirements of equal protection.93  In concluding 
that Proposition 2 ½ was lawfully adopted, and that it did not violate either the 
Massachusetts Constitution or the United States’ Constitution, the Court gave 
a major victory to the anti-tax proponents of the measure.94   
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld, in a 
related action, the authority of the Commissioner of the Department of 
Revenue to issue guidelines to cities and towns for determining the “full and 
fair cash value” of property when calculating levy limits.95  Even where such 
guidelines did not give individualized considerations for variations between 
communities, the Court stated that the Commissioner had the power to 
promulgate such regulations.96  The success of Proposition 2 ½ in the face of 
legal challenges inspired advocates of strict property tax caps in other 
jurisdictions, with a number of other states implementing similar measures in 
subsequent years.97   
 
2. Immediate & Short-Term Impact 
 
At the time Proposition 2 ½ was passed, local governments that imposed 
property taxes exceeding the 2.5% limit were required to reduce their tax levies 
by 15% annually until the cap was reached.98  Boston, for example, had a tax 
rate in 1980 equal to 10% of the full and fair cash value of all the real property 
within the city limits.99  Across the Commonwealth, “[b]y the autumn of 1981, 
approximately 15,000 city, town, and county employees had been laid off.”100  
In 1982, local revenue dropped by approximately $500 million; the impact of 
reduced revenue was mitigated only by an increase of $265 million in local 
aid.101  Proposition 2 ½ ultimately resulted in the proportion of local revenue 
raised by property taxes decreasing from nearly two-third prior to 1980, to 
approximately one-half of municipal budgets today.102   
                                                 
92  Id. at 236–38. 
93  Id. at 245. 
94  Id. at 245–46. 
95  Newton v. Comm’r of Revenue, 384 Mass. 115, 120 (1981). 
96  Id. at 121–22. 
97  Chang & Wen, supra note 4. 
98  ZIMMERMAN, supra note 39.  At the time Proposition 2 ½ was passed in 1980, 
52 municipalities with a population over 27,000 exceeded the capped rate imposed by 
the law, and subsequently had to reduce their tax rates gradually until they came in 
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99  Id. 
100  Id. 
101  See generally Chang & Wen, supra note 4; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 39. 
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Despite the fears of many politicians and citizens, Proposition 2 ½ did not 
initially have a devastating impact on cities and towns.  Rather, the statute took 
effect at the same time as the “Massachusetts Miracle,” a period of rapid 
economic growth in the Commonwealth after a decade of decline.103  Coupled 
with falling primary and secondary school enrollment, municipalities and 
school districts were able to reduce their budgets without drastically cutting 
services.104  Along with lower-than-forecasted energy costs and decisions to 
defer spending on maintenance, communities avoided the worst predictions 
about Proposition 2 ½.105  As previously noted, the strengthening economy 
allowed the General Court to provide a substantial increase in local aid in 
Fiscal Year 1983.106  Thus, timing was key in blunting the impact of 
Proposition 2 ½ at the time of its implementation.107   
From 1980 to 1985, property taxes in Massachusetts fell from 76% above 
the national average to 13% above the national average.108  As of 2017, the 
Commonwealth has the eighth highest property taxes in the country, 
significantly lower than the number one slot Massachusetts occupied during 
the years leading up to Proposition 2 ½’s passage.109   
Beyond the initial reduction in local property taxes seen because of the 
measure, there were non-economic outcomes that grew from the passage of 
Proposition 2 ½.  Many commentators at the time noted that Proposition 2 ½ 
was less about lowering taxes and more about voter empowerment in the face 
of an unresponsive Beacon Hill.110  Following the passage of Proposition 2 ½, 
The Boston Globe Magazine noted that the exercise of voters’ will through 
plebiscite revived a sense of accountability in elected officials on both the local 
and state levels.111  The subsequent trimming of municipal positions, required 
because of reduced budgets, led to a reduction in cronyism, and higher quality 
individuals being retained.112  In the short-term, several favorable outcomes 
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3. Long-Term Impact 
 
While the initial impact of Proposition 2 ½ was not the widespread 
devastation that many had feared, the long-term effects of the law cannot be 
understated.  Though the reduction in property taxes was welcomed by voters, 
in the long term, the cap imposed by Proposition 2 ½ has significantly 
impacted municipalities’ abilities to provide services.  Due to Proposition 2 
½’s cap, “many Massachusetts localities are experiencing cost increases [for 
providing services] beyond their control that far exceed their annual property 
tax growth threshold.”113  For example, health care costs dramatically impact 
municipal budgets.114  From 2001 to 2006, municipal health care costs grew 
by 13%, increasing from 7.4% to 10.6%, on average, of municipal budgets in 
Massachusetts.115  Despite this increase in costs, cities and towns are unable to 
increase property taxes, the main source of municipal revenue, beyond the 
2.5% cap.116  Consequently, in order to address fixed costs, other areas of 
municipal budgets have been cut.  Examining the hundreds of override votes 
proposed over the past few years, overrides are routinely floated by 
communities in order to support everything from high school sports and 
extracurriculars, to keeping operating budgets “level.”117   
Despite an initial increase in local aid from Fiscal Year 1982 to 1983, the 
bump was short-lived: today, local aid is approximately one-half of what it 
was three decades ago.118  This cut in state aid, combined with the restrictions 
Proposition 2 ½ places on communities’ abilities to raise funds for services, 
has led to a number of unintended consequences.  As early as 1988, The New 
York Times reported a “snowball[] effect”, as more and more towns were 
attempting override votes, because the amount of revenue growth under the 
cap was “not sufficient to keep up with inflation.”119   
Aside from the financial burden that Proposition 2 ½ has imposed, the 
measure has also significantly strained relations between municipal 
governments and the Commonwealth.  With their ability to raise revenue 
constrained, cities and towns now routinely petition the latter for funds.120  
Taken together, both the financial and non-financial impacts of Proposition 2 
½ have been much deeper than any of the proponents could have initially 
forecast. 
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4. Override Votes 
 
The impact Proposition 2 ½ has had on municipalities has been amplified 
by the law’s override measure.  The framework of Proposition 2 ½ is such that 
each community has a levy limit: the amount real and personal property taxes 
can be increased each year, which is 2.5%.121  The levy limit can be increased 
up to the levy ceiling, which is equal to 2.5% of the full and fair cash value of 
the property in a community.122  Generally, the levy ceiling changes every 
year, as “properties are added or removed from the tax roll and market values 
increase or decrease,” thus causing the value of taxable property in a 
community to change.123  
Each year, a community’s levy limit automatically increases 2.5% over 
the previous year’s levy limit.124  Beyond that, communities are able to 
increase their levy limits if there is new growth in the tax base (such as the 
development of a new subdivision).125  Finally, and most significantly, a 
community can override its levy limit through a majority vote for a specific 
dollar amount; if successful, the levy limit base is permanently increased by 
the amount of the override.126  While the original law only allowed 
municipalities to hold override votes if approved by the General Court, and 
required approval by two-thirds of voters in the municipality, a 1981 
amendment by the legislature removed the first requirement.127  City councils, 
mayors, or selectmen are allowed to place override questions on the local 
ballot.128  Additionally, the two-thirds requirement was reduced to a simple 
majority vote.129   
The override measure allows communities to override the 2.5% limit, and 
increase their property taxes beyond this threshold.130  As discussed below, the 
data makes clear that this model significantly favors wealthier communities 
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over poorer communities, resulting in widespread discrepancies across the 
Commonwealth in the level and in extent of municipal services provided.131   
 
5.  Arguments for Retaining Proposition 2 ½  
 
The arguments for retaining (or in the case of other states, implementing) 
strict property tax caps largely mirror the arguments which propelled the initial 
passage of such measures: greater local control, smaller government, and 
lower taxes.132  Perhaps the strongest argument for retaining a strict property 
tax cap in Massachusetts can be found in the Commonwealth’s tax rate itself.  
Massachusetts, though it has the eighth highest property taxes per capita 
(38.4% higher than the national average), has fallen sharply from the number 
one slot it occupied prior to the implementation of the cap.133  Although the 
number eight slot is still high, it is critical to note that Massachusetts localities 
are forced to rely more heavily on property tax revenues to fund local 
expenditures as compared to municipalities in other states.134  Unlike in other 
states, Massachusetts cities and towns are not permitted to levy other forms of 
taxes (such as sales or income taxes).135   
In 2000, the polling firm Lane & Company conducted a study 
extrapolating the difference between what taxpayers in certain communities 
would be paying if Proposition 2 ½ had never passed, versus what they paid 
under the current system.136  The study found that from 1983 to 2000, the per 
capita residential property tax levy dropped 1.6%, after adjusting for 
inflation.137  Despite the “savings” in property taxes this study found, it did not 
take into account other ramifications of the cap, such as increased fees or cuts 
in municipal services.   
“When local officials want more money than the levy limit allows, they 
must ask for it, instead of just taking it as they did before 1980,” noted Barbara 
Anderson, of Citizens for Limited Taxation; “[c]itizen empowerment is one of 
the best things about our property tax limit.”138  As Ms. Anderson noted, a 
renewed a sense of civic engagement and a sense of accountability in elected 
officials is another significant byproduct of the cap.  
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6. Arguments Against Retaining Proposition 2 ½ 
 
In 1980, the majority of residents in 67 of Massachusetts’s 351 cities and 
towns voted against Proposition 2 ½.139  The central argument against 
Proposition 2 ½, both when it was first enacted and today, is that the 2.5% tax 
cap and the 2.5% levy ceiling are arbitrary limits.140  Municipal officials have 
aptly noted in recent years that the law has not been significantly updated in 
thirty years.  Rather than staying responsive to modern needs, the law has 
remained static, even though “[t]he local government of 1982 is 
unrecognizable compared to today in terms of technology, health care, 
mandates, and particularly public education.”141  Along this same vein, the 
number of state and federal mandates have exploded since the 1980s.  
Proposition 2 ½ bans unfunded state mandates, but has no impact on federal 
mandates, nor does it take into the account the cost of implementing mandates 
which may not require funding in and of themselves.142   
Significantly, Proposition 2 ½ does not take into consideration the actual 
cost of providing services, inflation, or other extraneous factors.143  Arguments 
for reform or repeal of Proposition 2 ½ tend to focus on the capricious barrier 
the law imposes on local governments’ ability to raise revenues.144  Thus, 
“[w]hen some budget items increase faster than the cap,” which occurs nearly 
every year,  “other items must be cut to fit total expenditures under the cap.  
As a result, town and school services actually lose ground most years because 
of Prop[osition] 2 ½.”145  Strict property tax caps do not make services cost 
less; this results in cuts to services.146   
Opponents to Proposition 2 ½ point to two specific areas that have led to 
ongoing financial issues for many cities and towns.  Public employee benefits 
(significantly, healthcare costs), and education costs continue to rise.147  While 
proponents of Proposition 2 ½ argue that these costs need to be independently 
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376     UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 16, No. 2 
 
 
addressed, this argument ignores the fact that while strict property tax caps can 
limit the size of government, they cannot affect the cost of the services 
themselves.148  With mandated costs, communities are finding that they cannot 
afford sharp increases, despite their obligations to pay.149   
One of the strongest arguments against Proposition 2 ½ focuses on 
inflation.  Proposition 2 ½, unlike some strict property tax cap schemes, makes 
no allocation for inflation.150  Average yearly inflation has exceeded the 2.5% 
cap for twenty-four out of the past thirty-seven years, even reaching double-
digit inflation in a single year.151  Inflation has been below 2.5% for only 
thirteen years out of the past thirty-seven years.152  Consequently, 
municipalities’ buying power has eroded.  As inflation has risen, communities’ 
abilities to levy taxes in line with inflation has been handicapped.   
A 1996 article in CommonWealth Magazine noted that Proposition 2 ½ 
had “created a new culture for local governments,” forcing local officials to 
“look carefully at every spending item,” and having to become “leaner and 
more efficient.”153  While this may be true to some extent, efficiency can only 
go so far: having one less man on the highway department or reducing the 
hours of the town’s library may have a seemingly minimal short-term effect, 
but can have a much deeper long-term effect.  Similarly, the argument that 
caps would produce large savings through “efficiencies” was flawed; 
“efficiencies” to one person, such as the closure of a fire station or a library 
branch, “may represent the loss of a critical service for another person.”154   
The law also makes local governments heavily dependent on state aid, 
which tends to fluctuate with economic cycles and state politics.155  While 
some proponents of Proposition 2 ½ see this as a positive feature, it is more 
properly viewed as a major issue: in times of economic downturn, the need for 
municipal services stays the same or increases (i.e. the utilization of public 
libraries), while local aid shrinks.  Thus, “[t]he success of Proposition 2 ½ was 
based on revenue sharing between the state and federal government and cities 
and towns.  That partnership is shrinking, or ending, and the model no longer 
works.”156   
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D. The Unintended Consequences of a Strict Property Tax Cap in 
Massachusetts 
 
The promise of lower taxes and greater control proved alluring to voters 
across the country when faced with the opportunity to implement strict 
property tax caps.  While different regimes have varying frameworks, all have 
been driven by similar desires for greater local control and for lower taxes.157  
Despite initial excitement propelling the passage of these laws, outcomes have 
been more varied.   
Of the seven states that have some form of strict property tax caps, all have 
some of the highest property taxes per capita in the United States.158  New 
Jersey, which has a strict property tax cap, has the highest property taxes per 
capita in the country, at $2,819.159  Within the cohort of states with strict 
property tax caps, the lowest per capita property tax rate is seen in Oregon, at 
$1,292, which is still the twenty-sixth highest rate in the country.160  Thus, 
even in states that have implemented caps, almost all are in the top half of 
states in terms of per capita tax rates.161  While it is unclear whether or not 
strict property tax caps were implemented to address this issue (and failed to 
accomplish what they purported to do), or caused this issue, the fact of the 
matter remains that states with strict property tax caps, on average, have far 
higher per capita property taxes than states that do not have caps.162   
While some commentators point to Massachusetts as a success story in 
this regard, success depends on one’s interpretation.  Prior to the 
implementation of Proposition 2 ½, Massachusetts had the highest property 
taxes per capita in the country.163  Currently, Massachusetts has the eighth 
highest property taxes per capita nationwide.164  If municipalities had not 
chosen to approve override votes over the years, property taxes in the Bay State 
could be lower; however, many municipalities have felt forced to put forward 
overrides because necessary revenue cannot be raised under the cap’s rigid 
formula.   
A number of unexpected consequences have also arisen as a result of the 
implementation of strict property tax caps.  New York, for example, only 
implemented a strict property tax cap in 2012.165  A Cornell University survey 
published a year later found that “over 60% of villages and towns and over 
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80% of cities and counties across New York faced increased fiscal stress due 
to the tax cap.”166  Similarly, a story from The Boston Globe, titled “In 
Massachusetts, Budgets that Hurt” reflected on slashed municipal services in 
the wake of Proposition 2 ½, only eight years after the measure had been 
passed into law.167  Ultimately, “[i]n the absence of additional state aid,” local 
governments in states which have strict property tax caps “make more drastic 
service cuts and increase revenues through overrides and user fees [as 
compared to municipalities in states without caps].”168   
The other significant goal behind implementing strict property tax caps 
was a desire by voters for greater local control.  To some degree, strict property 
tax caps have accomplished this: in Massachusetts, the increasing number of 
proposed override votes illustrates the power voters have in making 
meaningful decisions over the future of their communities.169  Proposition 2 ½ 
has brought many financial issues to the forefront of local elections and town 
meetings.170  Yet, despite this increased civic engagement, strict property tax 
caps generally do not reduce the size of government.171  While the “fringes” 
may be cut in order to save money, it is far more common for local 
governments to rely more heavily on other sources of funding, whether that be 
petitioning Beacon Hill, or increasing local fees, rather than substantially 
shrinking the size and cost of government.172  Many areas of local government 
have funding mandates, so the size of government cannot be substantially 
reduced, even with strict property tax caps in place.173  Similarly, many costs 
that fall on municipalities, such as employee healthcare costs and education 
expenses, continue to rise; although local governments have no ability to curb 
these costs, they still have to pay for it within this framework.174   
The impact of strict property tax caps on municipal finances has been 
exacerbated by a reduction in local aid.  Municipalities in the Commonwealth 
derived (both in 1980 and today) the vast majority of their revenue through 
local property taxes.175  In the aftermath of Proposition 2 ½’s passage, cities 
and towns, worried about the impact of the cap, successfully achieved an 
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agreement with Beacon Hill to increase local aid.176  In the early- to mid-1980s, 
Beacon Hill kept this promise: local aid (including general local aid, Chapter 
70 (education aid), and school building assistance) continued to rise, reaching 
a peak in 1986.177  Over the past three decades, however, local aid levels have 
drastically declined.178  In 1986, total local aid, as a percentage of personal 
income, was approximately 2.4%.179  That figure fell to 1.7% by 2013.180  If 
the Commonwealth was dedicating “the same share of resources to local aid 
today” as it did thirty-five years ago, even when adjusting for inflation, cities 
and towns would be receiving approximately $1.7 billion more each year.181  
While the reduction of local aid was not a consequence of Proposition 2 ½, the 
increased reliance of municipalities on local aid is a direct result of the strict 
property tax cap.182   
Strict property tax caps can have varying impacts based on the makeup of 
a community.  This Note uses Massachusetts as a case study by examining the 
total number of Proposition 2 ½ override votes, both proposed and successful, 
that have been taken over three decades.  This data paints a picture of the 
impact strict property tax caps have had on communities.  Significantly, the 
relative wealth of a community is indicative of whether or not an override vote 
will pass; a community’s decision whether to approve or reject an override 
vote impacts what services a municipality can provide.183  This, in turn, creates 
greater disparities over time, as wealthy communities continue to provide 
services—thereby attracting other well-to-do families—and poorer 
communities continue to cut services.  While this cycle is fully discussed 
below, this fact illustrates the fundamental shortcoming of strict property tax 
caps: different communities have vastly different needs.  It makes little sense 
to impose a uniform constraining measure across an entire state, when each 
community has its own challenges to address.  Instead, strict property tax caps, 
with their “static and insensitive” nature, have “produced greater regional 
fiscal disparity” where they have been imposed than might otherwise be 
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IV. PROPOSITION 2 ½: THE DATA 
 
The data from Massachusetts’s three-and-a-half decade-long experience 
with a strict property tax cap illustrates the effectiveness of the law.  The 
rationale of the strict property tax cap model is that municipalities will be 
restrained in spending because they will be restrained in taxing.185  
Presumably, if the law functioned the way it was intended to, governments 
would “live within their means” under the cap, and thus the need for override 
votes would be few.  For those override votes that did occur, the success rate 
would be low, as voters presumably would not vote against their interests to 
increase their own taxes.186  However, by examining over three decades of 
data, it becomes clear that Proposition 2 ½ is not working as intended.  Since 
1983, there have been over 4,000 override votes, resulting in a 
disproportionately negative impact on communities with certain economic 
makeups.   
 
A. Override Votes Since 1983: A Growing Wave  
 
In 1983, the first communities in the Commonwealth were asked whether 
or not they wanted to raise their own property taxes by a percentage greater 
than the 2.5% cap.187  That year, 38 override votes were proposed across the 
Commonwealth in 28 different communities, ranging from $4,465 to 
$10,195,082.188  Of those 38 votes, 11 failed.189  The other 27 votes passed, 
thereby raising taxes on voters in those communities by the percentage 
necessary to match the amount of money approved.190   
From Fiscal Year 1983 through Fiscal Year 1989, 486 override votes were 
taken across the Commonwealth.191  More recently, from Fiscal Year 2000 
through Fiscal Year 2009, there were 1,182 override votes taken.192  Over the 
course of two decades, this represents an increase in the average number of 
votes taken from 69 votes per year, to 118 votes per year.  This dramatic 
increase in the number of proposed override votes—regardless of whether or 
not voters ultimately approved or rejected increasing their taxes—indicates a 
deeper problem.  As time has gone on, communities have found that they are 
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unable to support municipal services under the 2.5% cap imposed by 
Proposition 2 ½.  Consequently, selectmen, mayors, and town councils across 
the Commonwealth have been forced to ask voters to override the levy limit 
and increase their own property taxes.  As inflation has eroded the buying 
power of each dollar, and as services have become costlier to provide, the 
strain imposed by the 2.5% cap has caused increased pressure and has led to a 
greater number of override propositions being presented to voters in more 
recent years.   
 
1. 351 Cities & Towns: 351 Different Experiences 
 
In order to truly assess the effectiveness of the law, it is necessary to look 
at the impact Proposition 2 ½ has had on both the Commonwealth as a whole 
and on individual communities with different demographics and makeups.  
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has 351 cities and towns from the 
affluent suburbs of Boston to the small villages of the Berkshires.193  
Prosperous communities outside of Boston have approved overrides for over 
$10 million in a single year, while more rural communities in the central and 
western parts of the state have rejected proposed overrides for little more than 
$10,000.194  While most communities request larger figures for “general 
operating expenses,” other communities ask voters to approve narrowly 
defined spending requests—several communities have had over 100 override 
votes since 1983.195  
From 1983 through 2010, of Massachusetts’s 351 cities and towns, 304 
have taken at least one Proposition 2 ½ override vote; 47 have never taken an 
override vote.196  Of the 304 communities that have held at least one override 
vote, a total of 4,499 votes have been taken.197  Voters have approved 
overriding the 2.5% cap 1,826 times out of 4,499 votes taken.198  Thus, for all 
cities and towns that have taken a Proposition 2 ½ override vote, the average 
success rate of a proposed override vote passing is 40.58%.  This figure 
                                                 
193  MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL DATABANK/LOCAL 
AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011). 
194  Sullivan, supra note 37 (discussing Newton’s approval of a $11.5 million 
override in 2002, and Cambridge’s $10.2 million approval in 1983; Cambridge 
approved an addition $5 million in a separate vote in 1983, whereas Princeton, a rural 
community in the central part of the state, rejected a $10,000 override that same year); 
see also MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL 
DATABANK/LOCAL AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011). 
195  Sullivan, supra note 37; MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., 
MUNICIPAL DATABANK/LOCAL AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-
2010 (2011). 
196  MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL DATABANK/LOCAL 
AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011). 
197  Votes taken from the beginning of FY1983 through the end of FY2010.  See id. 
198  Id. 
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indicates that communities are willing—or were willing at some point over the 
past thirty years—to approve overriding Proposition 2 ½’s limits and increase 
their own property taxes.   
Distilling this data down further, a greater understanding of the law’s 
impact can be gained by looking at the economic profiles of the communities 
that have either approved or rejected override votes.  Using median household 
income data for each municipality in Massachusetts, and overlaying it with the 
success rates of Proposition 2 ½ override votes, allows a more complete picture 
of the impact the law has had on different communities.   
 
B. Community Wealth Determining Impact 
 
For the purposes of determining whether or not Proposition 2 ½ override 
votes are more successful in wealthy or poorer communities, the following 
designations were applied to Massachusetts communities.  Communities with 
median household incomes below $49,999 were designated as the “low” 
category; 32 cities and towns meet this definition.  “Low average” 
communities have a median household income between $50,000 and $74,999.  
This is the largest category, with 164 cities and towns meeting the criteria.  
Communities with median household incomes between $75,000 and $99,999 
were designated as the “average” category; 105 cities and towns meet this 
definition.  “High average” communities, totaling 35 cities and towns, have a 
median household income between $100,000 and $124,999.  Finally, the 15 
communities with a median household income exceeding $125,000 were 
designated as the “high” category.   
Addressing the first category, communities with a “low” median 
household income, 25 of the 32 cities and towns have had a Proposition 2 ½ 
override vote, 7 have not.199  Of the 25 communities that have had an override 
vote since 1983, voters approved override measures 27.125% of the time.   
The “low average” designation comprises the greatest number of 
communities of any of the categories: 164 cities and towns.  A total of 132 
communities where the median household income is between $50,000 and 
$74,999 have taken an override vote, 32 have not.200  In these 132 cities and 
towns, voters have approved proposed tax increases 41.612% of the time.  This 
closely mirrors the overall success rate for the entire Commonwealth, of 
40.58%.   
With regards to communities with the “average” median household 
income designation, 98 communities have taken a Proposition 2 ½ vote, and 7 
have not, out of the 105 communities in this category.201  Of the 98 
municipalities with a median household income between $75,000 and $99,999 
                                                 
199  See id.; BOSTON REGIONAL METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORG., MASS. MEDIAN 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY TOWN, 1979-2010 (2011). 
200  Id. 
201  Id. 
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that have had an override vote, voters approved the proposed overrides 
31.083% of the time, significantly less frequently than communities in the 
“low average” bracket, the designation directly beneath this category.   
For communities with the “high average” designation, 34 of the 35 towns 
have taken a Proposition 2 ½ override vote.202  The data from municipal votes 
from 1983 through 2010 indicates that in towns where the median income is 
between $100,000 and $124,999, the success rate for an override vote is 
49.325%.  This figure jumps drastically for communities with the “high” 
median household income designation, where the median household income 
exceeds $125,000.203  All 15 communities with this designation have had 
Proposition 2 ½ override votes.204  In this category, the success rate tops out at 
69.435%. 
 
C. Trends Based on Community Wealth 
 
 The overall trends indicated by three decades of voting data makes clear 
that voters in wealthier communities are more likely to approve Proposition 2 
½ override votes versus communities with lower median household incomes.  
To some degree that conclusion is intuitive: wealthier individuals can afford 
to increase their own property taxes to pay for municipal services whereas 
poorer individuals cannot.205  Within this framework, however, there is a 
notable point of pause.  While overall the success rate for override votes 
increases as median household income increases, the success rate for 
“average” communities does not follow this trend.206  Where median 
household income was “average,” between $75,000 and $99,999, the 
likelihood of overrides decreased, to 31.083%, relative to the “low average” 
category.  In communities with the “low average” designation, (where median 
household income is between $50,000 and $74,999), the success rate of 
override votes is much higher, at 41.612%.   
This data point could be interpreted to indicate that “low average” 
communities are more likely to approve overrides versus their immediately 
wealthier counterparts.207  Within the framework that this Note has proposed, 
                                                 
202  Id. 
203  Id. 
204  Id. 
205  Id. 
206  See MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL 
DATABANK/LOCAL AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011); 
BOSTON REGIONAL METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORG., MASS. MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME BY TOWN, 1979-2010 (2011). 
207  Id.  Rather than seeing “average” communities as bucking the trend by being 
less-likely to approve overrides versus poorer communities, it could be interpreted that 
“low average” communities are more likely to approve overrides versus the 
immediately wealthier category. 
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the “average” and the “low average” median household income groups are 
fairly large categories compared to the other designations this Note has 
identified.  The “average” category is comprised of 105 cities and towns. while 
the “low average” category is comprised of 164 cities and towns.208   
Although a full analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this paper, it 
does present an interesting opportunity for reflection.  Subdividing the “low 
average” category (where the median household income is $50,000 to 
$74,999) into two parts, a clearer picture forms.  Among communities where 
the median household income is between $50,000 and $62,499, the likelihood 
of a Proposition 2 ½ override vote passing is 36.974%.  Where the median 
household income level rises to between $62,500 and $74,999, the likelihood 
of voters approving a tax increase also rises, to 44.528%.  This further division 
of the “low average” category reflects the broader data, which indicates that 
wealthier communities are more likely to approve override votes versus poorer 
communities.209   
While it is unclear from the data why communities with the “low average” 
designation are more likely to approve override votes versus “average” median 
household income communities, the large sizes of both of these categories 
reflect greater diversity as compared to the categories at either the top or the 
bottom of the medium household income spectrum, with smaller sample sizes.  
Greater diversity in community composition, municipal needs, and geography 
necessitates different results.210   
Additionally, the uptick in approval seen in communities where the 
median household income is between $50,000 and $74,999 could reflect the 
support of young families for override votes.  Young families, who generally 
make less money, may be more likely to approve override votes than older 
individuals who have greater incomes.  This is because override votes are 
frequently for public school funding, which generally garners broader support 
from those who utilize the public school system compared to those who do 
not.211  The ultimate reason behind these disparities is not entirely clear from 
the data.  The data does, however, clearly illustrate the great diversity of 
communities in the Commonwealth, and the difficulty of implementing a “one 
size fits all” taxation cap on every community.   
What is truly striking from the data is the size of the disparity in supporting 
override votes between poorer and wealthy communities.  In communities 
where the median household income is less than $49,999, Proposition 2 ½ 
                                                 
208  Id. 
209  Id. 
210  See generally Chang & Wen, supra note 4 (for a discussion on the difficulties 
of sweeping mandates in the face of unique, local needs). 
211  See generally MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL 
DATABANK/LOCAL AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011) 
(noting that frequently, override votes are proposed to fund public schools and 
education services). 
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override votes only passed 27.125% of the time.212  In the wealthiest 
communities in the Commonwealth, however, where median household 
income exceeds $125,000, the success rate of an override vote skyrockets to 
69.435%.213  This wide disparity illustrates one of the greatest shortcomings in 
the framework of Proposition 2 ½: while the statute itself does not take into 
account inflation or individual community needs, wealthy communities can 
get around these shortcomings by voting for an override.  The model of 
Proposition 2 ½ favors wealthy communities whose residents can afford to 
absorb tax increases, leading to a bifurcation of services between towns.214  
Poorer communities, which cannot afford to approve tax increases, are more 
significantly harmed by this model.  Residents of poorer communities are often 
more dependent on many municipal services than wealthier communities and 

























                                                 
212  Id. 
213  Id. 
214  Id. 
215  See Nicholas Johnson, Phil Oliff & Erica Williams, Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities, An Update on State Budget Cuts: At Least 46 States Have Imposed 
Cuts That Hurt Vulnerable Residents and the Economy (2011) for a discussion of the 
impact smaller budgets have on the poor. 




D. Data Overview 
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E. Can a “One Size Fits All” Framework Work? 
 
Three decades of data from Massachusetts illustrates how the “one size 
fits all” model for strict property tax caps has had a disparate negative impact 
on poorer communities versus wealthier communities.  Every one of 
Massachusetts’s 351 cities and towns have funding needs that must be met, 
but the ability of many communities to meet their obligations is severely 
constrained by a tax framework that can be sidestepped only by wealthier 
communities.  Other studies of strict property tax caps have found that 
“[s]maller and less-densely populated communities tend to experience the 
greatest constraint from property tax limitations.”216  A similar pattern is seen 
in Massachusetts: successful overrides to fund municipal operating budgets 
“have been prevalent in high-income suburbs to the west of Boston, along with 
parts of the north and south shores, Pioneer Valley, and the Cape and Islands.  
Outside of urban corridors,” in more rural and poorer areas, however, voters 
have taken a much harder line on override votes.217  Consequently, “overrides 
have allowed wealthier communities to tax themselves more and maintain or 
improve services,” while poorer communities have fallen further and further 
behind.218   
 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Proposition 2 ½ was the outgrowth of noble intentions: a desire for smaller 
government, lower taxes, and greater civic involvement in local decision-
making.219  Despite these good intentions, three decades of data make clear 
that Proposition 2 ½ has had a disproportionately negative impact on poorer 
municipalities, communities that cannot successfully implement override 
votes in order to fund necessary municipal services.220   
In contemplating alternatives to strict property tax caps, it is important to 
keep in mind the original impetus behind them, namely greater voter control 
over local spending, as well as limiting tax increases.221  As discussed above, 
Proposition 2 ½ has promoted greater civic engagement and has helped to 
reduce Massachusetts’s property taxes from being the highest in the United 
                                                 
216  Chang & Wen, supra note 4. 
217  Sullivan, supra note 37. 
218  Chang & Wen, supra note 4. 
219  Anderson, supra note 5. 
220  See MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL 
DATABANK/LOCAL AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011); 
BOSTON REGIONAL METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORG., MASS. MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME BY TOWN, 1979-2010 (2011). 
221  Reschovsky, supra note 79. 
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States in 1980, to a slightly more respectable number eight slot today.222  At 
the same time, it is necessary to recognize that the world that spawned strict 
property tax caps is not the reality we live with today.223  The outsized negative 
impact of Proposition 2 ½ on poorer communities begs the question: what can 
be done to allow communities to raise the funds they need, while also being 
cognizant of the financial realities many households face?   
 
A. Indexing the Cap to the Rate of Inflation 
 
Perhaps the most feasible and straight-forward reform to Proposition 2 ½ 
would be to retain the ceiling on the total annual property tax revenue that a 
municipality can raise (2.5% of the total assessed value of the community’s 
taxable property), while altering the levy limit to either 2.5% per year (of the 
total full and fair cash value of all taxable real and personal property) or the 
rate of inflation.224  This is similar to the approach California took in its strict 
property tax cap, Proposition 13.225   
From 1980 to 2010, inflation increased an average of 3.638% per year in 
the United States.226  During that time, the highest rate of inflation during one 
year was 13.5%, while the lowest annual change was -0.4%.227  Altering the 
yearly levy limit cap to either 2.5% or the rate of inflation, whichever is higher, 
would be a minor change, with potentially significant consequences.  The first 
part of Proposition 2 ½ would remain unchanged: the total annual property tax 
revenue raised by municipalities could not surpass 2.5% of the assessed value 
of all taxable property in the community.228  However, the second part of 
Proposition 2 ½ would shift to allow communities to levy an increase in taxes 
by 2.5% per year of the total full and fair cash value of all taxable real and 
personal property, or the rate of inflation, whichever is higher.   
                                                 
222  Anderson, supra note 5; see MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., 
MUNICIPAL DATABANK/LOCAL AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-
2010 (2011) (illustrating the number of participating voters in Proposition 2 ½-related 
votes, indicating high civic engagement). 
223  Samples, supra note 3. 
224  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016). 
225  CAL. CONST. art. XIII, A, § 1 (limiting the tax on real property to 1% of the full 
cash value of the property, or an inflation factor, not to exceed 2% per value).   
Unfortunately, Proposition 13 does not provide fertile ground for examining the 
potential implications of indexing Massachusetts’s strict property tax to inflation; 
California’s approach not only put a cap on the full cash value of the property, but also 
capped the amount of the inflation factor to 2%.  This, combined with the numerous 
exceptions and concessions that have been made to Proposition 13 over its nearly four-
decades on the books makes it poor example to follow.  
226  Historical Inflation Rates: 1914-2017, supra note 22. 
227  Id. (inflation was only negative one year from 1980-2010). 
228  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016). 
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Such a shift would have two primary benefits.  First, it would retain the 
civic engagement and voter control over local spending that were central goals 
behind the initial push for Proposition 2 ½.229  Municipalities would not be free 
to raise taxes as high as they would like: the total annual property tax revenue 
raised by a municipality would still be capped at 2.5%.  However, this reform, 
by indexing levy limit to rate of inflation (or 2.5%, if inflation for a given year 
was below that), would allow communities to retain their buying power, power 
that is otherwise eroded when inflation increases but the cap does not.230  As 
costs increase because of inflation, communities would be able to keep up, and 
continue to provide services that might otherwise need to be cut.   
 
B. Capping the Budget 
 
Rather than imposing a cap on the total annual property taxes a 
municipality can impose, Massachusetts could look to impose a cap on the 
total amount each community’s municipal budget could increase each year.  
The tax rate would correspond to whatever was needed to meet the 
community’s budget.  This method would be similar to New Hampshire’s 
approach.231  New Hampshire allows individual cities and towns to adopt their 
own limits on local spending and local tax increases.232  This model affords 
individual cities and towns a significant amount of latitude: the Granite State 
allows voters to “adopt a limit on annual increases in the estimated amount of 
local taxes in the . . . proposed budget”, the limit can either be a fixed dollar 
amount or a fixed percentage.233   
If a cap was instituted on municipal budgets, however, many of the same 
issues seen with a cap on the amount taxes can increase would materialize.  
Without a provision to account for inflation, a cap—either in a dollar amount 
or a certain percentage—would steadily be eroded over time as the buying 
power of each dollar decreased.  Consequently, a cap on the overall budget, 
without addressing the root issues inherent to any strict-cap system, would 
prove less than satisfactory.   
 
C. Why Reform? Why Now? 
 
Proposition 2 ½ has, at various times, been heralded as a saving grace for 
Massachusetts taxpayers.  It has also been lamented as a monster set to destroy 
                                                 
229  Anderson, supra note 5. 
230  See Historical Inflation Rates: 1914-2017, supra note 22 for inflation rates 
from 1980 through the present. 
231  See generally FILMORE, supra note 23. 
232  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-C:33, I(d) (2017); id. § 49-D:3, I(e) (2017); id. § 
49-D:12, III (2017). 
233  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:5-b (2017); id. § 32:5-c (2017); FILMORE, supra note 
23. 
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public schools and municipal services.234  As the fortieth anniversary of the 
law’s passage approaches, the question remains: why reform Proposition 2 ½?  
Despite its flaws, it accomplished much of what it set out to achieve—lower 
taxes and greater civic control over municipal budgets.235  This notion, 
however, is limited.  Although proponents of Massachusetts’s strict property 
tax cap achieved their objectives in the short term, when examining the long-
term impact of the law, the numerous downsides of Proposition 2 ½ come into 
greater focus.   
Strict property tax caps present numerous challenges to municipalities, 
specifically to poorer communities.  The restrictive cap and levy limits have 
kept taxes low, but also have constrained municipalities from raising taxes 
necessary to pay for heavily utilized municipal services.236  Communities are 
further handicapped in providing services because inflation—which has 
averaged 3.638% from 1980 through 2010—has constantly outpaced levy 
limits.237  Further, local aid, promised by Beacon Hill, has significantly 
declined since the mid-1980s.238  Consequently, communities have been facing 
increasing pressure due to Proposition 2 ½’s restrictions.  Strict property tax 
caps have an inherently unsustainable nature as it relates to municipalities 
fulfilling their commitment to provide public services, especially, as the 
override voting data indicates, with regards to poorer communities.   
Change is necessary.  While increasing taxes is never a popular 
proposition, the reforms suggested here would keep a cap in place: taxes would 
not rise with abandon.  Rather, the caps would take into account an outside 
factor, inflation, in order to allow communities the ability to retain purchasing 
power in the face of changing times.  Timely reform should be a priority for 
Massachusetts legislators: more override votes are being proposed now than 
ever before.239  This indicates that local governments cannot operate under the 
cap, but instead are increasingly looking for voters to override the cap to fund 
the general budget.  Wealthier communities are more likely to approve 
override votes compared to poorer communities; over time, this has 
exacerbated differences between municipalities, as wealthier communities 
                                                 
234  See generally Gold, supra note 20; Kenney, supra note 19; Mildred Wigfall 
Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and Local Fiscal Policy at the 
Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property Tax as a Case in 
Point, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 511 (2002); Oliff & Lav, supra note 108. 
235  Anderson, supra note 5. 
236  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016). 
237  Historical Inflation Rates: 1914-2017, supra note 22. 
238  Schuster, supra note 22; Chang & Wen, supra note 4. 
239  See generally MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL 
DATABANK/LOCAL AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011). 
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have maintained or improved services, while poorer communities have had to 
continually cut services as voters refuse to approve overrides.240   
Proposition 2 ½, unlike some strict property tax caps in other states, is not 
a constitutional amendment—it is a simple law that can be repealed or 
amended by the legislature at its will.241  Since 1980, there have been attempts 
to repeal the law, though none of have succeeded.242  There is no question that 
Massachusetts legislators can amend Proposition 2 ½; the true question is 




Strict property tax caps place arbitrary limits on municipal taxing abilities.  
In Massachusetts, as in other states, it makes little sense to impose a uniform 
“constraining instrument” as each community has vastly different needs.243  
This issue has been heightened by the fact that the needs of many communities 
have changed dramatically since 1980; inflation rates have overwhelmingly 
outpaced levy limits; and promises of increased local aid by Beacon Hill have 
not materialized.244   
Moving forward, there is no one, clear answer.  No one wants to pay more 
taxes.  Given the 40.58% success rate for override votes over the past three 
decades, however, it is clear that people will agree to increase their taxes when 
municipal services they rely on are in jeopardy.245  Despite this, override votes 
do not solve the root problem: if municipal leaders continually need to appeal 
to voters because they cannot raise enough money under the current system, 
then the system is in need of reform.  
Laws are meant to be revisited and revised over time, in order to reflect 
the needs of the society that they have been crafted to serve.  Proposition 2 ½ 
has been in place for over three decades without any major revisions.246  The 
model it sets forth does not work in today’s day and age.  Proposition 2 ½ has 
                                                 
240  See generally id.; BOSTON REGIONAL METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORG., MASS. 
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY TOWN, 1979-2010 (2011). 
241  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016); see also CAL. CONST. art. XIII, A, § 1 
(exemplifying a strict property tax cap enshrined in a state’s constitution). 
242  See Citizens for Limited Taxation & Citizens Economic Research 
Foundation, supra note 9.  Though never repealed, several amendments in 1981 
changed minor points of Proposition 2 ½; for example, the provision for voters to 
approve an override vote was reduced from a two-third threshold, to a simple 
majority. 
243  Chang & Wen, supra note 4. 
244  Historical Inflation Rates: 1914-2017, supra note 22; Schuster, supra note 22.  
245  See MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL 
DATABANK/LOCAL AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011); 
BOSTON REGIONAL METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORG., MASS. MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME BY TOWN, 1979-2010 (2011). 
246  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C (2016). 
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had an outsized disparate impact on poorer communities—those that cannot 
afford to increase their own taxes above the cap.247  In order to allow 
communities to raise the funds necessary to provide municipal services, 
Proposition 2 ½ has to be revisited.  Addressing the future of strict property 
tax caps, in Massachusetts and elsewhere, is a pragmatic endeavor with real-
life consequences for individuals living in affected communities.   
                                                 
247  See MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF LOC. SERV., MUNICIPAL 
DATABANK/LOCAL AID SECTION, OVERRIDES SPREADSHEET FY1983-2010 (2011); 
BOSTON REGIONAL METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORG., MASS. MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD 
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